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Abstract: We revisit the relationship between aid and growth using a new data-set 
focusing on the 1990s.  The evidence supports the view that the impact of aid depends on 
the quality of state institutions and policies.  We use an overall measure of institutions 
and policies popular in the empirical growth literature.  The interaction of aid and 
institutional quality has a robust positive relationship with growth that is strongest in 
instrumental variable regressions.  There is no support for the competing hypothesis that 
aid has the same positive effect everywhere.  We also show that in the 1990s the 
allocation of aid to low-income countries favored ones with better institutional quality.  
This “selectivity” is sensible if aid in fact is more productive in sound institutional and 
policy environments.  The cross-country evidence on aid effectiveness is supported by 
other types of information as well: case studies, project-level evidence, and opinion polls 
support the view that corrupt institutions and weak policies limit the impact of financial 
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Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence 
By Craig Burnside and David Dollar 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, 84% of opinion makers agreed 
 with the statement that, “Because of corruption, foreign  
assistance to developing countries is mostly wasted.” 
 
–  Opinion survey commissioned by the World Bank 
 and conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates   
 
  In “Aid, Policies, and Growth” (Burnside and Dollar 2000b) we provided 
evidence that aid accelerates growth in developing countries with sound institutions and 
policies, but has less or no effect in countries in which institutions and policies are poor.  
We found these results quite intuitive: a corrupt, incompetent government is not going to 
use aid wisely and outside donors are not going to be able to force it to change it habits.  
This evidence is supportive of the growing trend among aid agencies toward greater 
“selectivity” – that is, channeling relatively more aid resources to poor countries with 
reasonably good institutions and policies.  The United States’s proposed Millenium 
Challenge Account is a recent example of this trend. 
Since we initially presented our results in a working paper in 1996, critics have 
taken issue with them.  However, our critics have not been able to agree among 
themselves about what the right model is: some find that aid never works anywhere 
(suggesting that it should be eliminated) while others find that it has a positive effect 
everywhere (suggesting that it should be given out indiscriminately).  The main purpose 
of this paper is to take a fresh look at the issue based on a new data-set focusing on the 
1990s. 
  It is useful to start with where there is agreement.  Most development economists 
believe that underlying economic institutions and policies are the main determinants of 
long-term growth.  Hall and Jones (1999), for example, argue that “differences in capital 
accumulation, productivity, and therefore output per worker are fundamentally related to 
differences in social infrastructure across countries.  By social infrastructure we mean 
the institutions and government policies that determine the economic environment within 
which individuals accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital and produce output.”    4
Similarly, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) conclude their study of “The 
Colonial Origins of Development” by noting that “Many economists and social scientists 
believe that differences in institutions and state policies are at the root of large differences 
in income per capita across countries.”  There is some disagreement about the relative 
importance of different institutions and policies, but that is not germane to our argument.  
We have not attempted to identify exactly which institutions and policies are important 
for aid effectiveness: rather we are interested in the question of whether the whole 
package of growth-enhancing institutions and policies is also a determinant of the 
productivity of aid.   
  A second area of agreement concerns the effect of aid on institutions and policies.  
Researchers coming from the left, the right, and the center have all concluded that aid as 
traditionally practiced has not had systematic, beneficial effects on institutions and 
policies [Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (1995); Rodrik (1996); Ranis (1995); Collier 
(1997); Dollar and Svensson (2000); Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren (2000)].  In 
particular, there is broad agreement that giving a large amount of financial aid to a 
country with poor economic institutions and policies is not likely to stimulate reform, and 
in fact may retard it.  More generally, we concur with Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001) that “there is little agreement …about what determines institutions and 
government attitudes toward economic progress….”  Their work, and the work of 
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), indicate that institutions are often quite persistent, but 
there are historical examples of significant reforms.   
Given that institutions and policies are important for growth and that aid has had 
little systematic effect on institutions and policies, we introduced the hypothesis that the 
impact of aid on growth is conditional on these same institutions and policies.  To 
investigate this empirically we created a policy index based on several variables used in 
the empirical growth literature (and in a follow-up paper, Burnside and Dollar (2000a), 
we added a rule of law measure to the index), and found that aid had a positive effect on 
growth in developing countries with significantly better than average institutions and 
policies, whereas aid had no positive effect in countries with average policies.  It is useful 
for the non-technical reader to provide a simple graphical representation of these 
findings, which we have updated in Burnside and Dollar (2003a).  We regress growth,   5
policy, and aid on the other variables (reflecting initial conditions) on the right-hand side 
of the growth regression, and extract the unexplained (residual) component of each 
variable.  We then sort the data into 9 groups using the 33.3 and 66.7 percentiles of aid 
and policy.  The average growth rate for each group appears to depend on the interaction 
between aid and policy (Figure 1).  To us this graph shows that institutions/policies 
matter (something that is not in dispute).  But the graph also shows that the effect of aid 
on growth also appears to depend on the level of policy.  When policy is bad, the level of 
aid seems to have little impact on growth; if anything, a slightly negative impact.  But for 
countries with good policies, giving sufficiently more aid seems to have a very positive 
impact on growth.  The key statistical question is whether the impact of aid on growth is 
different for the poor-policy observations than for the good-policy observations.   
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As noted, a number of papers have subsequently criticized our work.
1  Common to 
many of these criticisms is a change in specification, either in terms of estimation 
technique, or in terms of which variables are included in the regression that explains 
growth.  Subject to these changes, the interaction term between aid and a measure of 
institutions and policies sometimes loses significance.
2  In one case, Easterly, Levine and 
Roodman (2003) expand our original data set as well as changing the specification.  
Figure 1 is drawn with their data-set, so simply expanding the data-set in terms of the 
number of countries and the time periods covered does not alter the relationship that we 
found.  Elsewhere, in Burnside and Dollar (2003a, 2003b), we respond in detail to the 
specifics of these criticisms.  However, we doubt that further work with that original 
data-set (even expanded) is going to shed new light on this debate.   
So, our main contribution here is to build a new data-set focusing only on the 1990s.   
Also, we want to keep our eye on the policy question that motivated us: should aid 
allocations take account of differences in institutions and policies?  There are three 
mutually exclusive, if not exhaustive, hypotheses concerning this interaction of aid and 
institutions/policies: 
1.  aid has a positive effect on growth that is the same regardless of the quality of 
institutions and policies (that is, aid works the same in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe as in 
reformist Uganda); 
2.  the effect of aid on growth is conditional on the same institutions and policies that 
affect growth directly, so that growth-enhancing institutions such as property 
rights and rule of law make aid more effective; or 
3.  aid has no positive effect in any institutional environment: it is always money 
down the rat hole.   
The answer to our policy question depends on which of these hypotheses is correct.   
                                                 
1 Among our critics are Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), McPherson (2000), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), 
Dayton-Johnson and Hoddinott (2001, 2003), Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Lensink and White (2001), 
Lu and Ram (2001), Akhand and Gupta (2002) and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003).  Collier and 
Dollar (2002), on the other hand, find a result similar to ours working with a different measure of 
institutions and policies.   
2 Actually, we, ourselves, showed several specifications for which the result did not hold, so we should be 
listed among our critics.     7
  The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 1 we examine the evidence on aid 
allocations.  Using data for a large cross-section of developing countries, we show that in 
the 1980s the amount of aid a country received was not correlated with institutional 
quality, as measured by the Freedom House democracy index or the ICRG rule of law 
index, once population and income level are taken into account.  On the other hand, our 
data set suggests that in the 1990s the picture changed: countries with better institutions 
received significantly more aid.  One standard deviation higher on the indices of rule of 
law and of democracy corresponded to 28% more overall aid and 50% more finance from 
the World Bank IDA facility (which is part of foreign aid).  Our paper is not concerned 
with why this apparent shift in donor behavior has come about.  It may be a spillover 
benefit from the end of the Cold War; it may reflect deliberate decisions by donors to 
stop funding corrupt governments; and/or it may be a coincidence.  Our concern, rather, 
is whether or not this shift – whatever its source – led to an allocation of foreign aid that 
has more impact on growth and poverty reduction in the developing world, than aid has 
had in the past. 
In Section 2 we turn to our policy question.  Using a new cross-sectional data-set 
for the 1990s, and a measure of overall institutional quality that is currently popular in 
empirical growth studies, we find our original result to be quite robust if the focus is on 
choosing between hypotheses #1 and #2.  There is simply no cross-country evidence that 
aid promotes growth in every environment.  On the other hand, we find considerable 
support for hypothesis #2 in this new data-set, particularly when we estimate our model 
using instrumental variables techniques.  In fact, we find the institutions-aid interaction to 
be more robust than institutions by themselves. 
  Given that the number of countries in the world is finite, we suspect that one can 
always make the coefficient of interest lose significance.  We find specifications, for 
example, in which there is no significant link between institutions and growth.  So, in 
choosing between hypotheses #2 and #3, we doubt that cross-country empirical work 
alone can settle the debate.  Inevitably, there will be specifications in which the aid-
institutions interaction is not significant. 
  Since we doubt that cross-country regressions will settle the policy debate, in the 
third, and concluding section we briefly survey other information that is relevant.  The   8
argument that aid has a positive effect, but that its effect is conditional on having good 
institutions, has additional support from theory, case studies, and project level evidence.  
Also convincing is the recent poll of “opinion makers” in developing countries quoted 
above; it found overwhelming support for the view that corruption often limits the 
effectiveness of aid  [PSRA (2003)]. We would like to think that all this evidence, 
together, has encouraged a shift in the allocation of aid, away from an indiscriminate 
distribution toward one that favors developing countries with reasonably good institutions 
and policies. 
 
1.  Shifting Aid Allocation from the 1980s to the 1990s 
 
In studying the relationship between institutions and growth, researchers have 
used a number of different measures of institutional quality.  Several recent studies 
[Easterly and Levine (2003); Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999)] use an 
overall index of institutional quality that is compiled by standardizing and averaging all 
of the different institutional variables available in the second half of the 1990s (hereafter 
referred to as KKZ).  This overall measure is ideal for our growth analysis in the next 
section, because we need a summary measure of growth-enhancing institutions and 
policies to interact with aid and this particular measure is available for more than 120 
countries in the 1990s.  However, in this section we want to look at how the allocation of 
aid has changed between the 1980s and 1990s, and for this we need institutional quality 
measures that are available over a longer span of  time. 
Some of the other institutional quality measures that have been used in the 
empirical growth literature are: the rule of law component from the KKZ aggregation 
[Dollar and Kraay (2003); Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002)]; the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) expropriation risk index [Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001)]; composite ICRG and Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) indexes 
[Knack and Keefer (1995)]; an index combining five ICRG indicators with the Sachs-
Warner openness index [Hall and Jones (1999)]; the bureaucratic efficiency, political 
stability and institutional efficiency indexes composed of nine Business International (BI) 
indicators [Mauro (1999)]; and the composite ICRG index and the Freedom House   9
democracy index [Rodrik (1999)].  The latter two have the advantage that they are 
available for many developing countries going back into the 1980s.   
To see how the allocation of aid has changed over time, we regress the log of net 
aid receipts of each developing country (annual average in the 1980s) on log per capita 
income in 1980 (and its square), log population in 1980 (and its square), and the 
averages, in the 1980s, of two institutional quality measures: the ICRG rule of law index 
(which ranges from 1 to 6, where higher number indicates better rule of law)  and the 
Freedom House democracy index (ranging from 1 to 3,  where a higher number is more 
authoritarian).  We should emphasize that this is not a model of donor behavior.  There is 
a literature that explains donor allocations in terms of economic and political variables 
[Alesina and Dollar (2000); Boschini and Olofsgard (2002)].  We have a more modest 
ambition here, which is simply to look at how much assistance is going to countries with 
differing institutional quality, after controlling for per capita income and population.   
In the ODA equation for the 1980s there is a modest relationship between aid and 
democracy, but it is not significantly different from zero (Table 1).
3  The relationship 
between aid and rule of law is negative, but again not significant.  It is also interesting to 
look at the allocation of the World Bank’s IDA facility, funds that are contributed by 
OECD donors and counted as part of overall aid.  In the 1990s the contributors stipulated 
that these funds should be allocated in favor of poor countries with sound institutions and 
policies.  In the 1980s it can be seen that the allocation of IDA was similar to the 
allocation of overall ODA: no significant relationship with institutional quality.  IDA 
funds are only given to low-income countries, whereas much of total ODA goes to 
middle-income countries.  Table 1 also shows the allocation of ODA, with the coverage 
constrained to the 42 low-income countries that received IDA.  The basic point here is 
that in the 1980s there was not much relationship between institutional quality, on the one 
hand, and how much ODA or IDA a country received, on the other.  One standard 
deviation more democratic plus one standard deviation better rule of law, corresponded to 
3% more aid and 11% more IDA in the 1980s. 
Similar regressions for the 1990s reveal a changed picture: both ODA and IDA 
are positively correlated with institutional quality.  For ODA as a whole, the relationship 
                                                 
3 The variables and the sources of data are described in detail in the appendix at the end of the paper.    10
is not that strong.  The individual t-statistics on the Freedom House and ICRG measures 
are not that large.  However, democracy and rule of law are positively correlated across 
countries to that it is important to look at the joint test as well.  The p-value for the joint 
test that the two coefficients are zero is 0.17 for total ODA.  For IDA there is a stronger 
relationship; Freedom House and ICRG are both significant, and the p-value for the joint 
test is below 0.01.  Finally, the joint test is significant at the 2 percent level for total 
ODA, if the coverage is constrained to low-income countries (Column 6).  The 
coefficients indicate that one standard deviation better on both institutional measures 
corresponds to 28% more ODA and 50% more IDA.  Again, we are not taking a stand on 
why this shift has come about.  But as a factual matter, we can say, in general, that where 
there are countries of equal poverty and population but differing institutional quality, the 
country with better institutions received more aid in the 1990s – and that that was not the 
case in the 1980s. 
Figures 2 and 3 show these relationships for IDA.  These are partial scatters: on 
the horizontal axis is the part of rule of law uncorrelated with the other variables in the 
regression, so it can be thought of as an index of unexpectedly good and bad rule of law.  
The vertical axis indicates which countries are getting unexpectedly large amounts of 
IDA.  It is very clear that in the 1980s there was no relationship at all between how much 
IDA countries were receiving and which countries had relatively good rule of law.  In the 
1990s, on the other hand, there is now a clear relationship.  In the upper-right quadrant 
one finds a number of well-known reformers (China, Uganda, Ghana) receiving amounts 
of IDA that were large given their per capita incomes and population; in the lower-left, 
on the other hand, countries such as Haiti, Nigeria, Angola, and DR Congo have 
unexpectedly poor institutions and lower amounts of IDA.    
Figure 2.  IDA and Rule of Law, 1980s 
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We think that this is useful background for the debate about the robustness of the 
aid variable in cross-country growth regressions.  Referring back to the three hypotheses 
that we noted in the introduction: if you think that the evidence supports hypothesis #1, 
then this shift that we have documented is a bad thing that should be reversed by giving 
more aid to countries with poor institutions; if you think that the evidence for hypothesis 
#2 is pretty robust, then this shift – whatever its initial source – is a positive trend that 
should be encouraged; and if you think that the evidence supports hypothesis #3 then it 
would be logical to oppose any aid programs aimed at promoting growth in the 
developing world.   12
Figure 3.  IDA and Rule of Law, 1990s 
 
 
































































2.  Aid and Growth 
The basic hypothesis that we want to explore is that the effect of aid depends on 
the same institutions and policies that affect growth directly.  For this analysis we need a 
good summary measure of institutions and policies.  In our original paper we constructed 
our own index.  But in light of the recent literature on institutions and growth, it now 
seems to us to make more sense to use one of the overall indices used in the literature.
4  
The one that provides the best country coverage in the 1990s is the overall institutional 
quality measure from KKZ, which enables us to include 124 countries in our regressions.  
To link back to Section 1, the KKZ measure standardizes and averages other institutional 
                                                 
4 In retrospect creating our own policy index resulted in limiting the country coverage to countries for 
which we had all the component data.  The limited number of countries in turn was one reason why we 
organized the data into a panel with four-year periods.  One thing that we have learned from the dialogue 
with our critics is that most of the variation in the variable of interest, aid interacted with 
institutions/policies, is cross sectional.  Therefore, organizing the data into a panel is not particularly useful.  
Here, we focus on a single cross section for the decade of the 1990s – the era after the end of the Cold War.    13
quality indices, such as the ICRG rule of law measure and the Freedom House democracy 
measure.  When we regress the overall measure of institutional quality in the 1990s from 
KKZ on the ICRG rule of law index and the Freedom House index, the R
2 is .82 and the 
t-statistic on each measure is over 10—indicating that the KKZ measure basically 
combines the information from those sources.  We take the KKZ measure as an index of 
the extent to which a country’s overall institutions and policies create a good 
environment for entrepreneurship and growth. 
Before introducing the interaction of institutional quality and aid, let us examine 
whether there is any evidence of a direct relationship between aid and growth, not 
mediated by institutions.  We start with OLS regressions of average annual per capita 
GDP growth in the 1990s on initial per capita GDP in 1990, the institutional quality 
measure, and receipts of aid relative to GDP.  As a measure of aid we take net Official 
Development Assistance flows as reported by the OECD.  We have the requisite data for 
124 countries.  We will treat all of the right-hand-side variables as endogenous, but it is 
useful to start with OLS regressions to understand the patterns in the data.  
Growth in the 1990s is negatively correlated with initial income (suggesting 
conditional convergence) and positively associated with institutional quality; after 
controlling for these there is a negative coefficient on aid that is significant at the 10 
percent level (Table 2, Column (1)). This is an important point that we want to 
emphasize.   After controlling for initial income and the quality of institutions, there is a 
pretty strong negative correlation between aid and growth, which is depicted in the partial 
scatter of Figure 4.  Anyone who wants to argue that aid works well in all institutional 
environments is swimming upstream against this evidence.  Column 2 introduces a full 
set of regional dummies corresponding to the World Bank’s classification: East Asia 
(EAP), South Asia (SAR), Middle East and North Africa (MNA), Sub-Saharan Africa 
(AFR), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and Former Soviet Union (FSU) with 
rich countries as the default.
5  In general, as we proceed through the analysis, we do not 
find these regional dummies to consistently be important, with the exception of EAP, 
                                                 
5 We use the Former Soviet Union as a regional designation rather than the World Bank Region that 
includes the FSU called Europe and Central Asia (ECA). When we included an ECA dummy, rather than 
an FSU dummy, it was significant, but with both dummies included only the FSU dummy was significant.    14
SAR, and FSU.  With these three regional dummy variables included, aid has a negative 
coefficient, but it is no longer significant.   
Figure 4.  Aid and Growth in the 1990s (no regional dummies) 
 
 











































































































































The second panel in Table 2 shows the same specifications, but now initial 
income, institutions, and aid are all treated as endogenous.  There are good reasons to 
treat each of the right-hand-side variables as endogenous.  In the case of aid, it is very 
possible that the negative correlation between aid and growth reflects the endogenous 
response of aid donors to countries hit by unexpected shocks or crises.  Without 
instrumental variables, growth regressions involving aid are suspect.  In the case of initial 
per capita GDP, measurement error would introduce a negative correlation between 
initial income and subsequent growth.  In the case of the institutions variable, we are not 
too worried about reverse causation from fast growth to good institutions in a ten-year 
period.  However, all of the institutional quality variables are essentially subjective, and 
there is a danger of a “halo effect” in which fast-growing countries are rated to have good   15
institutions.  Since the measure we use comes from 1996, which is in the middle of the 
decade of growth that we are studying, we take the issue of the halo effect seriously.  By 
using instrumental variables we hope to deal with this issue.   
We use an instrument set that has been developed in cross-sectional growth 
empirics: (i) the share of the population that speaks English, (ii) the share that speaks a 
continental European language, (iii) distance from the equator, (iv) the logarithm of 
population, and (v) the logarithm of population interacted with each of the other 
variables.  Other work has shown that the language and distance variables are correlated 
with per capita GDP in 1990 and with institutional quality.  Recall, from Table 1, that 
population is highly correlated with aid receipts relative to GDP.  Since we ultimately 
want to instrument for institutions interacted with aid, it makes sense to interact 
population with the other exogenous variables.  It is difficult to instrument for three (and 
ultimately four) variables at once, and below we examine the question of how valid and 
relevant the instruments are. 
In the Table 2 IV regressions, aid continues to have a negative coefficient in the 
specification without regional dummies, but now the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero.  We start with this table to make two points.  First, in three out of six 
specifications aid has a negative coefficient.  If one is looking for evidence of hypothesis 
#1, that aid has the same positive effect on growth everywhere, it is difficult to find any 
encouragement in the growth evidence from the 1990s.  A second important point is that 
even for a variable that is considered very robust in the growth literature, such as 
institutional quality, it is not hard to find plausible specifications in which the variable is 
not statistically significant, as is the case in all three IV regressions. 
The results may reflect problems with the instruments.  Table 3 shows the first-
stage regressions.  For initial income and institutions, the R
2s are 0.60, while for aid 
(0.37) and aid interacted with institutions (0.26) they are fairly high as well.  However, 
with several endogenous variables the first-stage regressions by themselves do not 
indicate whether the instruments are good.  Some additional insight comes from Table 4, 
which shows correlation among the right-hand-side variables and the predicted values 
from the first-stage regressions.  For each variable the predicted value is highly correlated 
with the actual value.  But a potential problem is that predicted 1990 per capita GDP and   16
predicted institutions have a correlation of 0.98.  On the other hand, the correlations 
among predicted aid, predicted institutions, and the predicted interaction term are not 
worrisome.  We will address this issue more formally below. 
Returning to the aid-growth relationship, Hansen and Tarp argue that aid has a 
positive effect in all institutional/policy environments, but that it is subject to diminishing 
returns.  In Table 5 we test for this by including the square of aid relative to GDP.  In 
OLS there is a negative coefficient on aid and a positive one on aid squared (the opposite 
of diminishing returns), but these results are not robust.  So, even allowing for 
diminishing returns, there is no evidence of an unconditional positive link from aid to 
growth.      
Now we introduce the interaction of institutions and aid, and instrument for the 
four right-hand-side variables with the same instrument set (Table 6).  With no regional 
dummies (Column 3), the aid-institutions interaction is strongly positive and significant 
at the 10 percent level, while none of the other variables is significantly different from 
zero.  Adding the three regional dummies (Column 4) does not alter the coefficients very 
much, but now the aid-institutions interaction just misses being significant at the 10 
percent level.  Other than regional growth patterns, the thing we have most confidence in 
from the 1990s is that the combination of good institutions and foreign aid supports rapid 
growth in the developing world. 
We were curious that in the OLS specifications (Columns 1 and 2) the coefficient 
on the aid-institutions interaction was positive, yet insignificant, in contrast to the IV 
regression.  Looking at the data, we found two countries that were anomalous in the sense 
that they were reported to have very poor institutions, but extremely rapid growth in the 
1990s: Haiti and Equitorial Guinea.  Table 7 shows the four specifications without these 
two countries.  Note that the IV regressions are nearly identical with those in table 6, but 
with increased statistical significance for the aid-institutions interaction (5 percent level).  
The fact that the IV regressions are quite similar with and without the outliers suggests 
that instrumenting has effectively dealt with measurement error.  But the OLS regressions 
turn out to be heavily influenced by those two observations.  Without them, the OLS 
regressions show the same strong relationship between growth, on the one hand, and aid 
interacted with institutions, on the other, that we find in the IV regressions.   17
What do we make of the size of the estimated coefficients?  The KKZ index has a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.0.  But that is across all countries, including 
developed ones.  Large-scale aid mostly goes to low-income countries, where values of 
the KKZ index are negative or slightly greater than zero.  The coefficients estimated from 
the full sample (Table 6) indicate that the marginal impact of aid on growth in India is in 
the range of .16 (Column 3) to .34 (Column 4), equivalent to a 16-34 percent  rate of 
return on investment.  In neighboring Pakistan, with institutions measured to be far 
weaker, the marginal impact of aid is estimated to be negative.  The quantitative estimate 
of what aid can accomplish in a good institutional environment is similar to what we 
found in our original paper.   
We assess our choice of instruments in two ways. First, our IV regressions are 
based on the identifying assumption that the instruments are not correlated with the error 
term in the regression. Since we have more instruments than regressors,  for each IV 
specification in tables 2-7 we report the p-value for a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions.  In all specifications we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are orthogonal to the error term in the regression.  In Tables 6 and 7, the p-values for this 
test range from .84 to .97.  We find this result very plausible: it essentially says that the 
historical and geographic variables that we use as instruments do affect growth in the 
1990s, but they do so through their effect on 1990 per capita income, the quality of 
institutions, the level of aid, and the interaction of the latter variables. 
Second, when attempting to instrument simultaneously for four right-hand side 
variables, it is important to determine whether the instruments collectively capture 
independent variation in the right-hand-side variables.  We refer to this as instrument 
relevance. One approach to assessing the quality of the instruments is to look at the R
2s 
from the first-stage regressions to see if the instruments are correlated with the right-hand 
side variables in the growth regression..  With four endogenous variables, however, this 
approach tells us very little.  For example, it is possible that the first-stage regressions for 
two variables—say, institutions and 1990 per capita GDP—both look very good, in the 
sense that the R
2s from these regressions are high.  Nonetheless, it is also possible that the 
fitted  values from these regressions are highly correlated with each other, so that it is 
difficult to identify their effects in the second stage regression.  This situation would arise   18
if just one instrument, say the share of English speakers, was providing most of the 
explanatory power in both first stage regressions.   
We follow Shea (1997) in testing for the relevance of our instruments.   The 
procedure is as follows.  Take one of the right-hand side variables in the growth 
regression, say aid, a.  Regress a on the other right-hand-side variables of the growth 
regression.  The residual from this regression, a , is the new information that the aid 
variable brings to the OLS growth regression.  Then run the first stage regressions, and 
construct the fitted value of aid, denoted a ˆ . Regress a ˆ  on the other fitted values from the 
first stage regressions for initial income, institutions, and aid interacted with institutions.  
The residual from this regression, a ~, is the new information that aid brings to the IV 
regression.  Finally, regress a on a ~.  The coefficient in this regression is 1.0, by 
construction, but the p-value and R
2  indicate whether the information that the aid variable 
brings to the IV regression is in fact highly correlated with the information that aid brings 
to the OLS regression.  I.e. they indicate whether the instruments have sufficient 
relevance for the right-hand side variables in the growth regression.   
Table 8 shows the results for our test of instrument relevance for the four 
endogenous variables from specification 3 in table 6.  The tests suggest that our 
instruments are relevant in the sense that p-values are all .001 or below and the R
2s are all 
above .10, except for institutions, for which it is 0.09.  We have already highlighted the 
potential problem of collinearity between predicted institutions and predicted 1990 per 
capita GDP.  Our own reading of the literature is that the evidence for convergence over a 
period as short as a decade is mixed at best.  So, in Table 9 we drop 1990 per capita GDP 
and simply run a horse race among institutions, aid, and aid interacted with institutions.  
In the IV regressions it is only aid interacted with institutions that is statistically 
significant. 
A final robustness check is to treat initial per capita GDP and the institutions 
measure as exogenous and only instrument for aid and aid interacted with institutions 
(Table 10).  Now, initial income and institutions have the intuitive signs, but are not 
statistically significant when we instrument for aid and aid interacted with institutions.    
Aid-institutions interaction is again positive with a p-value just above 0.05 in the 
specification without regional dummies.      19
 Thus, with a new data-set covering a different period (the 1990s) and using a 
different index of institutions and policies, we find the same basic pattern that we 
identified in Burnside and Dollar (2000a,b): the combination of good institutions/policies 
and external aid appears to lead to more rapid  growth.   
 
3.  Conclusions 
  In conclusion, our original finding that aid spurs growth conditional on the quality 
of institutions and policies is quite robust.  We find the relationship in a new data set 
focusing on the 1990s and using an overall measure of institutional quality.  Our 
strongest conclusion from the cross-country work is that there is far more evidence that 
aid spurs growth conditional on institutions, than for the competing hypothesis that aid 
has the same positive effect in all institutional environments.  On the other hand, because 
all cross-country statistical results are fragile, we cannot completely reject the hypothesis 
that aid never works anywhere.  Like most economists we believe that institutions and 
policies matter for growth, but it is possible to find specifications in which the 
institutional quality variable is not significant, so a limitation of the cross-country 
approach is that it cannot definitively settle some debates. 
  Fortunately, policy makers do not form judgments based simply on cross-country 
regressions.  There are other types of information that are useful for those trying to 
establish effective aid policies.  First, one should not underestimate the importance of 
theory.  Given that institutions and policies affect growth, it is difficult to write down a 
coherent growth model—unless one assumes international capital markets are perfect—in 
which the impact of aid would not be conditional on the same institutions and policies.
6  
For aid to have no impact in a low-income country, regardless of the quality of  
institutions, would require a degree of perfection in international capital markets that we 
find implausible.  So, based on theory, it is quite plausible that aid would promote growth 
in poor countries that manage to put good institutions into place. 
  A second type of information that is relevant comes from case studies.  There is 
fairly broad agreement that the Marshall Plan accelerated European growth after World 
War II: this is the ideal example of the model we have in mind, with a significant volume 
                                                 
6 See Burnside and Dollar (2000c).   20
of finance pumped into an environment of solid institutions and social infrastructure.  We 
would argue that this one case disproves hypothesis #3, that aid is always money down 
the rat hole.  There are quite a few case studies of aid to developing countries.  Many of 
these support the view that money channeled to a highly corrupt government with 
distorted economic policies provides no lasting benefit.  On the other hand, studies of 
successful aid typically emphasize that the recipient government had a good set of 
policies to enhance growth and directed assistance to useful investments in roads, 
schools, and the like.  
  A third type of evidence that is relevant comes from data on individual projects 
financed by aid.  In a variety of sectors, projects are more likely to be successful in 
countries with growth-enhancing institutions and policies [Isham and Kaufmann (1999)].  
When South Korea was a low-income country with a large amount of aid in the 1960s, 
most projects, of many different types, were successful.  In Kenya and Zimbabwe in 
recent decades, on the other hand, many projects, of all types, have failed, in the sense 
that they have not provided the services or benefits anticipated from the investment.  If 
aid were not fungible, this project level evidence would settle the debate.  However, it is 
possible that all of the good projects in Korea would have been financed by private 
capital in the absence of aid, so that project-level evidence alone cannot settle the debate 
about aid effectiveness.   Once we combine the evidence from case studies and projects 
with the cross-country correlations, however, we feel more confident that aid 
effectiveness depends on institutions and policies. 
  We were also interested to see the results of a global poll commissioned by the 
World Bank from a private survey company [PSRA (2003)].  The poll focused on 
“opinion makers” in a wide range of developing and developed countries (that is, 
government officials, academics, the media, trade union leaders, NGOs, etc.).  In Sub-
Saharan Africa, 84% of opinion makers agreed with the statement that, “Because of 
corruption, foreign assistance to developing countries is mostly wasted.”  In other regions 
of the developing world, similarly large majorities agreed with the statement.  Opinion 
makers in the rich countries were the least skeptical (only 58% agreed with the 
statement).  So, while first-world academics may find some specifications in which aid   21
works in all institutional environments, that argument is going to be a tough sell in the 
developing world. 
  A final important point in this debate concerns incentive effects.  We and others 
have found that in the past aid has not systematically led to improvements in institutions 
and policies.  But the phrase “in the past” is quite important.  In the past aid has been 
allocated indiscriminately with regard to the institutions that are critical for growth.  If 
the allocation rule changes, then the past evidence tells us little about what may happen in 
the future.  We would not expect aid—even  well managed—to to be a main determinant 
of reform.  But if aid is systematically allocated to low-income countries with relatively 
good institutions, then we would expect that this would increase the probability that 
reforms are successful and politically sustainable. Thus, aid could be a useful support to 
reform even if it is not its main determinant.  Our line of reasoning is speculative, but it is 
not unreasonable to think that allocating aid to relatively good governments would have a 
positive incentive effect. 
   Based on all the evidence, we think that it is good news that aid is now more 
systematically allocated to countries with sound institutions and policies. If anything, we 
would encourage aid-givers to strengthen this trend even more.   
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Table 1.  Allocation of ODA and IDA in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
  

















































































































































Observations 70  42 42 83 40 40 
R-squared 0.46  0.76  0.78  0.59  0.75  0.81 
F test  0.40  1.08  0.04  1.80  6.33  4.53 
Prob > F  0.67  0.35  0.97  0.17  0.00  0.02 
 
Notes: 
  Dependent variables are net aid flows in 1980s and 1990s         
 Robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses        
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
F test is test of joint significance of Freedom House Index and ICRG index  
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Table 2.  Aid and Growth in the 1990s 
 
 OLS  IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Growth9099  Growth9099 Growth9099 Growth9099 Growth9099 Growth9099






































AFR   -0.004 
(0.27) 
   0.001 
(0.03) 
 
















LAC   0.019 
(2.32)** 
   0.020 
(1.43) 
 
MENA   0.021 
(1.75)* 
   0.022 
(1.34) 
 




















Observations  124 124 124 124 124 124 
R-squared 0.15  0.36  0.26       
OID: Sargan 
statistic 
    5.12  6.32  3.63 
OID: Chi-sq p-
value 
    0.40  0.28  0.60 
 
Notes: 
Dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita GDP in 1990s       
Robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     27
Table 3.  First-stage Regressions 
 
  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
























































































Observations 124  124  124  124 
R-squared 0.60  0.60  0.37  0.26 
F test  30.31  45.11  11.12  4.74 
Prob > F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
Notes: 
Dependent variables are endogenous regressors in Table 2         
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
F test is test of joint significance of all the regressors 
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Table 4.  Correlations among Explanatory Variables 
 

















 Ln per capita 
GDP 1990  1            
  Institutions 0.8164  1            
  Aid/GDP -0.6714  -0.4528 1           
  Aid*Institutions 0.5634  0.5006  -0.7578 1         
Ln per capita 
GDP 1990  0.7771  0.7536  -0.4267 0.3666  1       
Institutions 0.7581  0.7725  -0.4339 0.3787  0.9755  1     











Aid*Institutions 0.5629  0.5781  -0.5463 0.5061  0.7243 0.7483  -0.9027  1 
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Table 5.  Aid, Growth, and Diminishing Returns in the 1990s 
 
 
 OLS  IV 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Growth9099  Growth9099  Growth9099  Growth9099 






















































Observations 124  124  124  124 
R-squared 0.17  0.27     
OID: Sargan statistic      4.96  2.26 
OID: Chi-sq p-value      0.29  0.69 
 
Notes: 
Dependent variable is growth rate of per capita GDP in 1990s       
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 6.  Aid, Growth, and Institutions in the 1990s 
 
 OLS  IV 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Growth9099  Growth9099  Growth9099  Growth9099 






















































Observations 124  124  124  124 
R-squared 0.16  0.27     
OID: Sargan statistic      1.45  0.55 
OID: Chi-sq p-value      0.84  0.97 
 
Notes: 
Dependent variable is growth rate of per capita GDP in 1990s   
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
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Table 7.  Aid, Growth, and Institutions in the 1990s without Haiti and Equatorial Guinea 
 
 OLS  IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Growth9099  Growth9099  Growth9099  Growth9099 






















































Observations  122 122 122 122 
R-squared 0.25  0.39    
OID: Sargan 
statistic 
   1.26  0.71 
OID: Chi-sq p-
value 
   0.87  0.95 
 
Notes: 
Dependent variable is growth rate of per capita GDP in 19990s     
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
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Table 8.  Testing for Instrument Quality with Shea Partial R-Squared 
 
   Bars 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




    
Institutions   1.000 
(2.88)*** 
  










Log per capita GDP        1.000 
(3.62)*** 
 Observations  124  124  124  124 
 R-squared  0.22  0.09  0.11  0.14 
 
Notes: 
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 9.  Aid, Growth, and Institutions in the 1990s – No Initial Per Capita GDP 
 
  
 OLS  IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 













































Observations  124 124 124 124 
R-squared 0.11  0.26    
OID: Sargan 
statistic 
   3.78  3.37 
OID: Chi-sq p-
value 
   0.58  0.64 
 
Notes: 
Dependent variable is growth rate of per capita GDP in 1990s     
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         34
Table 10.  Aid, Growth, and Institutions in the 1990s – Initial GDP/capita and Institutions 
Exogenous 
 
 OLS  IV 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Growth9099  Growth9099  Growth9099  Growth9099 






















































Observations 124  124  124  124 
R-squared 0.16  0.27    
OID: Sargan 
statistic 
   6.53  7.40 
OID: Chi-sq p-
value 
   0.37  0.29 
 
Notes: 
Dependent variable is growth rate of per capita GDP in 1990s     
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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afr  Dummy [=1 if country is in Africa (WB region)] 
aidgdp  (Average annual ODA or OA in the 1990s[DAC]) / (average annual real GDP in the 
1990s[Penn World Tables 6.1]) 
aidgdpsq "aidgdp"  squared 
aidKKZ  Interaction of "aidgdp" and "KKZ96" 
disteq  Distance from the equator, measured as absolute value of latitude of the 
capital 
eap  Dummy [=1 if country is in East Asia & Pacific (WB region)] 
eca  Dummy [=1 if country is in Europe & Central Asia (WB region)] 
engfrac  % of population in the country speaking English (Hall and Jones, 1999) 
eurfrac  % of population in the country speaking a major European language (Hall and 
Jones, 1999) 
fh8089  Freedom House Democracy Index  (1=most democratic; 3 = most authoritarian), 
average for 1980-1989 
fh9099  Freedom House Democracy Index  (1=most democratic; 3 = most authoritarian), 
average for 1990-1999 
fsu  Dummy [=1 if country is in the Former Soviet Union] 
growth9099  Average annual growth of real GDP/capita in the 1990s 
KKZ96  Average of 6 governance indicators (ranges from -2 to 2, increasing with better 
institutions), 1996 (KKZ 2003) 
lac  Dummy [=1 if country is in Latin America & the Caribbean (WB region)] 
lnida8089  Log of average annual net IDA to the country, 1980-1989 (DAC) 
lnida9099  Log of average annual net IDA to the country, 1990-1999 (DAC) 
lnoda8089  Log of average annual net ODA to the country, 1980-1989 (DAC) 
lnoda9099  Log of average annual net ODA to the country, 1990-1999 (DAC) 
lnpop80  Log of population, 1980 (Penn World Tables 6.1) 
lnpop80sq "lnpop80"  squared 
lnpop90  Log of Population, 1990 (Penn World Tables 6.1)   36
lnpop90sq "lnpop90"  squared 
lny80  Log of real GDP per capita in constant 1996$ [chain series], 1980 (Penn World 
Tables 6.1) 
lny80sq "lny80"  squared 
lny90  Log of real GDP per capita in constant 1996$ [chain series], 1990 (Penn World 
Tables 6.1) 
lny90sq "lny90"  squared 
mena  Dummy [=1 if country is in Middle East & North Africa (WB region)] 
popdist  Interaction of "lnpop90" and "disteq" 
popeng  Interaction of "lnpop90" and "engfrac" 
popeur  Interaction of "lnpop90" and "eurfrac" 
rule8089  ICRG index for Rule of Law (ranges from 1 to 6, increasing with better rule of 
law), average for 1980-1989 
rule9099  ICRG index for Rule of Law (ranges from 1 to 6, increasing with better rule of 
law), average for 1990-1999 
sar  Dummy [=1 if country is in South Asia (WB region)] 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 